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Note
Just Wars with Unjust Allies: Use of Force and
Human Rights Considerations on the Russian
Intervention in Syria
Brendan Delany
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Table(s): Overview of the Syrian Civil War1
1. See generally Elliot Friedland, Who’s Who in the Syrian Civil War,
CLARION PROJECT, https://www.clarionproject.org/factsheet/whos-who-syrianwar# (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (identifying and explaining the involved parties
to the Syrian Civil War); see also Kathy Gilsinan, The Confused Person’s Guide
to the Syrian Civil War, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/;
Hashmatallah Moslih, Iran ‘Foreign Legion’ Leans on Afghan Shia in Syria
War, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iranforeign-legion-leans-afghan-shia-syria-war-160122130355206.html (explaining
how an estimated 20,000 Afghan Shia fighters fight with Iranian troops on
behalf of the Assad regime); Mona Mahmood & Martin Chulov, Syrian War
Widens Sunni-Shia Schism as Foreign Jihadis Join Fight for Shrines,
GUARDIAN (June 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since the drafting of the United Nations (“UN”) Charter,
many states have engaged in acts of armed intervention abroad.
These states have justified such actions on the grounds of
individual or collective self-defense, often claiming their troops
were lawfully invited onto foreign soil by another state. In
September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin justified
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War in support of the
Syrian government in the following terms:
Russia has always been firm and consistent in opposing
terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military and
technical assistance both to Iraq and Syria that are
fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous
mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian
government and its Armed Forces, who are valiantly
fighting terrorism face-to-face. We should finally
acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s Armed
Forces and Kurd Militia are truly fighting the Islamic
State and other terrorist organizations in Syria.2
The government of Syria since 2011 has been fighting insurgent
groups, which control vast swathes of territory within Syria, and
both government and opposition forces have committed war
crimes and other egregious human rights violations as a matter
of systemic policy.3 While Russian military involvement was
syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrines-volunteers; Aron Lund, The Baath Battalions
Move Into Damascus, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54167?lang=en; Nour Samaha, The Eagles of the
Whirlwind, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 28, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/28
/the-eagles-of-the-whirlwind/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&
utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=Flashpoints (explaining the
SSNP’s participation in the civil war).
2. Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, Statement at
the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly 6 (Sept. 28, 2015) (unofficial
translation), http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_RU_
EN.pdf; see also Who Is Fighting Whom in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/the-syria-conflictsoverlapping-agendas-and-competing-visions.html (explaining that Russia
backs Assad’s regime).
3. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter UNHRC Report] (explaining how
parties to the conflict “[c]onduct hostilities with little, if any, regard for the laws
of war and, in particular, its foundational principle of distinction”); LAW AND

2017]

JUST WARS WITH UNJUST ALLIES

565

initially limited to airstrikes and the provision of armaments,
Russian ground troops have increasingly become involved in
Syrian government offensives, despite President Putin’s recent
announcement of a partial Russian withdrawal from the
conflict.4 The Russian intervention raises questions regarding
the legality of one state invoking self-defense, humanitarian
intervention, or intervention by invitation as a basis for
intervening in another state’s internal armed conflict, where the
inviting government lacks effective control of the nation’s
territory. State governments have a sovereign right under
international law to invite foreign troops onto their territory but
that right can erode or vanish in situations of internal armed
conflict, as in Syria, where the legal legitimacy of an inviting
government becomes uncertain.5 The intervention also raises
questions regarding the potential liability incurred from willing
collaboration with a government engaged in systemic human
rights violations.
The civil war in Syria developed out of a period of civil
unrest, beginning in March 2011 as part of the Arab Spring,
when mass demonstrations against the dictatorial regime of
President Bashar al-Assad began.6 The Assad regime responded
WAR IN SYRIA 3 (Willem-Jan Van Der Wolf & Claudia Tofan eds., 2013); Syria:

‘Shoot to Kill’ Commanders Named: Security Council Should Refer Syria to ICC
for Crimes Against Humanity, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 15, 2011),

https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/15/syria-shoot-kill-commanders-named.
4. See William Watkinson, War on Isis: ‘Hero’ Russian Special Forces
Soldier Calls Airstrike on Himself to Kill Daesh Fighters, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/war-isis-hero-russian-special-forcessoldier-calls-airstrike-himself-kill-daesh-fighters-1551636; Report of the

Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab
Republic, MINISTRY DEF. RUSSIAN FED’N (Mar. 26, 2016), http://eng.mil.ru/en/

news_page/country/more.htm?id=12081622@egNews (“In the course of last 24
hours, near [Palmyra, Homs province], the Russian Aerospace Forces have
performed 40 sorties engaging 158 objects of terrorists.”); Second Group of
Russian Sappers Arrived at Hmeymim Airbase in Syria, MINISTRY DEF.
RUSSIAN FED’N (Apr. 1, 2016), http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.
htm?id=12082062@egNews (explaining Russian mine clearing operations in
Palmyra, Syria).
5. See Christopher J. Le Mon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in
Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741,
742–43 (2003); see also Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 877, 882 (2004) (“Absent authorization by the Security Council, the
only licit use of force today by one State against another—under both the
Charter and customary international law—is in self-defense against an armed
attack, and this is true whether the action is taken individually (by the direct
victim of an armed attack) or collectively (by third States coming to the
assistance of the victim State).”).
6. Alexander De Juan & André Bank, The Ba’athist Blackout? Selective
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to these protests by imprisoning, torturing, and killing
thousands of opposition protestors, and, by June of 2011, an
armed insurrection seeking the overthrow of the regime had
emerged.7 Opposition insurgents, who are predominantly Sunni
Arab, have since fractured into numerous groups, which include
moderate groups backed by Western nations, such as the Free
Syrian Army, as well as hardline Islamist groups, such as
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (al-Qaeda in Syria), and the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”).8 ISIL is also at war with various
Kurdish militias who control much of northern Syria, and who
are backed by a Western led military coalition in the form of
airstrikes against ISIL.9 The Syrian government has received
military assistance in the form of financing, weapons, special
operations troops, and air support from Russia and Iran while
many of the major opposition rebel groups have received
weapons from Turkey and certain Sunni Arab Gulf States
opposed to Syria and Iran.10 In July 2015, following a series of
military defeats and rebel territorial gains, the Assad regime
made a formal request to Russia for airstrikes targeting rebel
groups.11 Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned Western
military support for opposition rebels as “attempts to undermine
Goods Provision and Political Violence in the Syrian Civil War , 52(1) J. PEACE
RES. 91, 93–94 (2015); see also Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Oct.
9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
7. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 6; see also LAW AND WAR IN
SYRIA, supra note 3, at 3.
8. See generally sources cited supra note 6 (explaining the origins of the
Syrian Civil War and the various parties to the conflict).
9. See generally id. (explaining ISIL’s alignment in relation to other
groups in the Syrian Civil War).
10. See Laila Bessam & Tom Perry, How Iranian General Plotted Out
Syrian Assault in Moscow, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/10/06/us-mideast-crisis-syria-soleimani-insigh-idUSKCN0S02BV
20151006; see also Ilya Arkhipov, Stephan Kravechencko & Henry Meyer, Putin
Officials Said to Admit Real Syria Goal is Far Broader , BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/putin-officialssaid-to-admit-real-syrian-goals-are-far-broader; Russia Arming Syria to

Counter Terrorism: Russian Weapons Will Help the Syrian Army Defeat
Terrorism, SPUTNIK NEWS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://sputniknews.com/middle
east/20150909/1026775138/russia-syria-weapons.html#ixzz3sSkuEahK;

Russia Carries Out First Air Strikes in Syria: Russian Bombs Target Positions,
Vehicles and Warehouses that Moscow Believes Belong to ISIL, Defence
Minister Says, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2015/09/russian-carries-air-strikes-syria-150930133155190.html; see generally
sources cited supra note 6 (explaining the origins of the Syrian Civil War and
the various parties to the conflict); sources cited supra note 4 (explaining
Russian and Iranian assistance in the Syrian Civil War).
11. Russia Carries Out First Air Strikes in Syria, supra note 10.
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the authority and legitimacy of the United Nations” and to
“export revolutions” against a sovereign government.12 The
Russian Air Force began bombing opposition rebel targets
within Syria in late September 2015.13 These airstrikes have
succeeded in drastically shifting the momentum of the war in the
Assad regime’s favor as the Syrian Arab Army (“SAA”) and proAssad paramilitary fighters in the National Defense Forces
(“NDF”) have advanced on multiple fronts aided with Russian
air support, as was recently shown in the encirclement and
capture of the city Aleppo by the SAA.14
Russia’s attempted rescue of the faltering Assad regime
likely carries several potential consequences under
international law. If the Russian decision to intervene in Syria’s
civil war is unlawful, then the Russian nation might be held
liable for its breach of international obligations. This Note will
examine three questions in the context of the Russian decision
to intervene: First, may the government of a state legally invite
another state to assist it in winning its own civil war? Second, if
such invitations to intervene are lawful, is the legality of such
interventions affected by the human rights record of the inviting
state? Finally, if human rights concerns do not factor into the
legality of interventions by invitation under international law,
should they? The heinous and widespread atrocities committed
against combatants and civilians alike, by members of the SAA
and NDF, may also implicate Russian military commanders and
political leaders. This Note will also analyze such potential
issues of individual criminal liability, which will hinge on the
current state of international humanitarian law, human rights
law, and international criminal law.

12. Putin, supra note 2, at 3, 4.
13. See Who is Fighting Whom in Syria, supra note 2.
14. See generally Raja Abdulrahim, Syrian Forces, Helped by Russian

Airstrikes, Seize Rebel Stronghold: Advances in Northwestern Lataika
Province Put Assad Regime in Striking Distance of Region Uunder Opposition
Control, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-forceshelped-by-russian-airstrikes-seize-rebel-stronghold-1453663114; What Comes
Next
in
Aleppo?,
AL
MASDAR
NEWS
(Dec.
19,
2016),
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/comes-next-aleppo/; sources cited supra
note 4 (explaining Russian and Iranian assistance in the Syrian Civil War).
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A. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT (JUS AD BELLUM):
REGULATING THE RESORT TO USE OF FORCE AND STATE
LIABILITY FOR WAGING WAR

International law regulates the decision by States to go to
war (jus ad bellum) and the sub-category of international
humanitarian law (“IHL”), also referred to as the law of armed
conflict or law of war, regulates the conduct of forces while
engaged in armed conflicts (jus in bello). IHL also defines the
conduct and obligations of all parties and persons involved in an
armed conflict. International law jus ad bellum, as such,
concerns any breach of the non-use of force principle, such as
crimes against peace or waging a war of aggression. IHL applies
only in situations involving an “armed conflict” and operates
differently in situations of international and non-international
(internal) armed conflicts. Only in international armed conflicts
do the protections of all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
apply in their entirety, and, for states who have ratified it, those
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as well. In
contrast, non-international armed conflicts are covered by only
the minimal humanitarian protections of Article 3 common to all
four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3), the
universally applicable peremptory norms of IHL and human
rights law, the domestic law of the state experiencing the
internal armed conflict, and potentially Additional Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions.15 Given the intensity of the internal
conflict, the absence of open or significant participation of the
foreign State’s armed forces against the Assad government, and
the degree of organization of the Syrian opposition rebel groups
15. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 22–27 (2010); see also Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 26 I.L.M.
568 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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exerting effective control of territory, the civil war within the
territorial borders of Syria is most likely an internal armed
conflict within IHL.16
The sources of international law include treaty law,
customary international law, and jus cogens (peremptory)
norms, which are considered so fundamental to international
law, and which are accepted by nations so universally that no
derogation from them is permissible.17 Violations of certain
peremptory norms confer universal jurisdiction for any nation to
apprehend and prosecute violators in their domestic courts, and
such violators are deemed enemies of humanity.18 Peremptory
norms, including the principles of non-intervention, the
prohibition of the use of force, self-defense, and the prohibition
against torture, may apply to individuals or states and are
relevant to analyzing the Russian intervention.

16. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 142 (explaining the test for the existence
of armed conflict focuses on the “intensity of the conflict and the organization of
the parties to the conflict”); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IV
COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 49–50, art. 3.1 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1952),
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=
LookUpCOMART&articleUNID=A4E145A2A7A68875C12563CD0051B9AE;
see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State.”); Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_view
States=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=475.
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“The Court . . . shall
apply: (a) international conventions . . . (b) international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; (d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.
53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (holding that treaty
laws are void if they conflict with a peremptory norm of international law);
VCLT, supra art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void
and terminates.”); LAW AND WAR IN SYRIA, supra note 3, at 41.
18. TERRY GILL & DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 502–27 (2d ed. 2015).
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1. The Prohibition of the Use of Force, the Non-Intervention
Principle, Self-Defense, and Intervention by Invitation
The prohibition on the use of military force, in the absence
of an explicit authorization by the United Nations Security
Council or for means other than self-defense, has become a
peremptory norm of international law as has the customary
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations.19
The non-use of force principle, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter, directs that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” and
is directed at inter-state conflicts.20 This prohibition on the use
of force by nations as a matter of political policy does not prohibit
nations from invoking their customary right to use force in selfdefense.21 Article 51 of the UN Charter states that all nations
have an “[i]nherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs . . . until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”22 Both individual and collective self-defense require an
“armed attack” to occur against a state, and in the case of
collective self-defense against a state which invites a foreign
state to intervene and consents to the presence of foreign troops
on its territory.23 IHL in any exercise of self-defense requires
that the core legal norms applicable to armed conflicts be
observed by State and non-State parties to the conflict, and those
norms are the principles of distinction, military necessity,
19. See Karine Bannelier & Theodore Christakis, Under the UN Security
Council’s Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian
Conflict, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 862 (2013); see also U.N. Charter arts. 2,

39–42.
20. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
21. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27) (“Moreover, a definition
of the ‘armed attack’ which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the
‘inherent right’ of self-defence, is not provided in the Charter, and is not part of
treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which
‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law. It rather
demonstrates that in the field in question, the importance of which for the
present dispute need hardly be stressed, customary international law continues
to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two sources of law thus
do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content. This could
also be demonstrated for other subjects, in particular for the principle of nonintervention.”).
22. U.N. Charter art. 51.
23. See generally Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14.
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proportionality, and the prohibition against causing
unnecessary suffering.24
Certain exceptions to Article 2(4)’s general prohibition on
the use of force have been asserted by legal scholars and through
state practice, including humanitarian intervention and the
intervention by invitation exception, which overlaps with
collective self-defense considerably, but the legality of these
exceptions has proven to be highly controversial.25 The consent
of one host nation for another nation to militarily intervene in
its own territory “is generally recognized as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act which would otherwise be
illegal under international law,” including military
interventions which would otherwise violate Article 2(4), or
where no right to self-defense exists under certain conditions.26
The Russian position that it was invited to intervene by the
legitimate government of Syria could be described as a collective
self-defense justification, and President Putin’s statements of
the presence of Russian citizens fighting in opposition rebel
groups could be interpreted as a justification for individual selfdefense.
2. The Doctrines of State Responsibility and Attribution
States invited to intervene are still bound by international
law, as the inviting state may not grant more authority than it
itself possesses.27 International law holds states accountable for
their wrongful acts, such as violations of the non-intervention
principle or other peremptory norms, under the doctrines of
state responsibility and attribution.28 State responsibility
attaches legal liability for a state’s commission of internationally
wrongful acts to that state, and the doctrine of attribution
determines when a state should be held liable for such acts

24. See id. ¶ 176; see also SOLIS, supra note 15, at 250.
25. Ahmed Ali M. Khayre, Self-Defence, Intervention by Invitation, or
Proxy War? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, 22 AFR. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 208, 211 (2014).
26. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 252.
27. Id. at 253.
28. See James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 876 (2002)
(“To be precise, the key idea is that a breach of a primary obligation gives rise,
immediately by operation of the law of state responsibility, to a secondary
obligation or series of such obligations (cessation, reparation . . . ).”).
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under state responsibility.29 The doctrine of attribution requires
proof of a causal connection between an act or omission of state,
or state organ, and a breach of an international obligation to
attribute liability to such state under international law.30 Russia
thus remains bound by international law in its decision to enter
the Syrian conflict, as well as for the conduct of their political
leaders and military forces with respect to the civil war in Syria,
and any actors within Syria deemed to be organs of the Russian
State may make Russia liable for any breaches of international
law caused by such actors under state responsibility.
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND CRIMINAL LAW (JUS
IN BELLO): REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF INDIVIDUAL
PARTICIPANTS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PRESCRIBING
PUNISHMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. IHL Will Govern the Conduct of Russian Military and
Political Leaders in Relation
to
Syria
and
International Criminal Law Prescribes Punishments for
Any Violations of IHL

Jus in bello regulates the conduct of individuals once an
armed conflict has begun and includes criminal sanctions for
actions designated by IHL as war crimes.31 IHL is divided into
two strands of law, the (1) Geneva Law, or humanitarian law
governing the protections afforded to individuals in armed
29. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 63, art. 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Report] (“Every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility
of that State.”), at 177, art. 21 (“The wrongfulness of an act of a State is
precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”).
30. Id. at 68, art. 2 (“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State
when conduct consisting of an act or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State
under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the State.”), at 74, art. 3, at 84, art. 4(1) (“The conduct of any State
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law . . . “), at
92, art. 5 (“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State
under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State
under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity
in the particular instance.”), at 95, art. 6 (“The conduct of an organ placed at
the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former
State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements
of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.”).
31. SOLIS, supra note 15, at 22, 301–02.
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conflict and limitations on means available to participants in
armed conflict, and (2) Hague Law, which defines armed
combatants and assesses the legality of military objectives and
regulates the methods of armed warfare generally.32 Core IHL
peremptory norms, derived from these sources of law and state
practice, include the principles of proportionality, unnecessary
suffering, military necessity, and distinction. These principles
together generally allow attacking armed forces, who have
conducted a prior collateral damage analysis, to carry out
proportionate attacks against military objectives even when it is
known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur.33 Such
attacks are lawful under IHL when the resulting civilian
casualties are not disproportionate to the military advantage
gained from the attack, so long as civilians are distinguished
from armed combatants and not directly targeted, and so long as
weapons incapable of meeting the distinction requirement or
which cause unnecessary suffering are not employed.34
International criminal law (“ICL”) is a category within
public international law, which aims to prohibit certain acts or
omissions by individuals, including certain violations of IHL,
international human rights law, and peremptory norms, and to
prescribe punishments for such violations.35 As a result of the
widespread violations of human rights by both regime and
32. Id. at 22–24.
33. See Yoram Dinstein, Direct Participation in Hostilities, 18 TILBURG L.
REV. 3, 4–5 (2013) (“The essence of the principle of distinction is that civilians
(or civilian objects) ought to be protected from attack. This protection has three
dimensions. The first is barring direct attacks against civilians qua civilians . . .
[t]he second dimension . . . is the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks . . . the
third dimension . . . [is] known as the principle of proportionality.”).
34. See Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l
Criminal Court 5 (Feb. 9, 2006) (on file with the International Criminal Court)
(“A crime occurs if there is an intentional attack directed against civilians
(principle of distinction) (Article 8(2)(b)(i)) or an attack is launched on a military
objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle of
proportionality) (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)).”); FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 41 (3d ed. 2001) (“The most basic tenet of humanitarian
law with respect to the employment of means of warfare is the rule laid down
in Article 22 of the Hague Regulations: ‘The right of belligerents to adopt means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.’ The principle was reaffirmed in
Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent (Vienna, 1965) and subsequently, in 1968, in Resolution 2444
(XXIII) of the UN General Assembly.”).
35. See KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME:
FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 55–56 (2013).
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opposition forces, these fields of law will bind Russian military
forces and political leaders with respect to their acts and
omissions in Syria.36 Russia and Syria have signed but have not
ratified the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”), yet many of the provisions of that statute have
developed into peremptory norms of international law.37 Some
jus cogens norms of IHL applicable to the Russian intervention
on behalf of the Assad regime include the prohibitions against
torture,38 against genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity,39 and of proportionality.40 All uses of force must
36. See id. at 54–56.
37. LAW AND WAR IN SYRIA, supra note 3, at 47 (“Syria is not a party to the
Rome Statute, and therefore the International Criminal Court may not exercise
jurisdiction over war crimes alleged to have been committed by on its territory
unless the situation is referred to the Court by the UN Security Council.”).
38. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 156
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that the ICTY
has recognized this norm, which it has said confers universal jurisdiction for
every State “to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals
accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.”); see
also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(f), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
39. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 6 (“For the purpose of this Statute,
‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with [mens rea] intent to
[actus reus] destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part . . . “), art. 7(1) (“ For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against
humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
[mens rea] knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; . . . (e)
Imprisonment . . . (f) Torture; (g) Rape . . . (h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, . . . or other grounds . . . (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; . . . (k)
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”), art. 8(1)–
(2) (“The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission
of such crimes. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: (a) Grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property . . . (i) Wilful killing; (ii) Torture or
inhuman treatment, . . . (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; . . . (vi)
Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of
fair and regular trial . . . .”).
40. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 51 (stating that the civilian
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adhere to the principle of proportionality, embedded as a
peremptory norm by Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, which
prevents the use of military force in a manner, which
unnecessarily endangers or harms civilians.41
2. Individual
Criminal
Responsibility in ICL

Liability

and

Command

Within ICL there are several ways in which international
criminal courts, such as the ICC, as well as the internal courts
of states, may punish violations of IHL or human rights law.42
Violations of peremptory norms confer universal jurisdiction
allowing nations to apprehend and charge violators in their own
courts, and this precedent has been strengthened by the
customary duty of states to prosecute or hand over such
violators.43 Modes of liability in ICL pertinent to military
commanders in armed conflict include individual liability, direct
command responsibility, and indirect command responsibility.44
Individual liability means that “[p]ersons who actually commit
an offence while possessing the requisite mental element are
criminally responsible.”45 Individual liability can also derive
from the acts of others as international treaty and customary
law has taken the position that persons who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the

population and individual civilians “shall not be the object of attack” and
prohibiting indiscriminate attacks), art. 57 (“In the conduct of military
operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects.”).
41. Id. art. 52.
42. See Marta Bo, The Situation in Libya and the ICC’s Understanding of
Complementarity in the Context of UNSC-Referred Cases, 25 CRIM. L. F. 505,
506 (2014) (“Complementarity embodies the concept that the Court was
designed to ‘supplement . . . rather than supplant domestic enforcement of
international norms’: in brief, the Court should step in exclusively when states
fall short of exercising their primary obligation to prosecute crimes falling
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).
43. See generally Att’y-Gen. of the Gov’t of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.
L. R. 5, 287 (1962) (“It is a peculiarly universal character of these crimes that
vests in every state the authority to try and punish anyone who participated in
their commission.”).
44. See generally INT’L CRIM. LAW SERV., MODULE 9: MODES OF LIABILITY:
COMMISSION & PARTICIPATION, http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_
9_Modes_of_liability.pdf.
45. GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 550.
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planning, preparation, or execution of a crime are individually
criminally responsible for that crime.46
Command responsibility derives from the relationship
between a commander and his subordinates and makes a
military or civilian commander, who possesses authority to issue
binding orders to the perpetrator of an international crime, and
who indirectly or directly orders that perpetrator to commit a
crime to be held criminally liable for that crime, if it is
committed.47 Direct command responsibility involves a
commander’s liability for the wrongful acts of his direct
subordinates (i.e. soldiers of the same army he is commander of)
and likely will apply to Russia in Syria only through the direct
participation of the Russian Air Force and any violations of IHL
by those forces, as Russian ground troops officially act only in an
advisory capacity in providing technical assistance to SAA
ground units and likely do not exercise direct control over SAA
or Iranian military units.48 Indirect command responsibility
confers criminal liability to a military commander, for actions
committed by forces deemed his subordinates, on various
theories of negligence or recklessness in a commander’s acts or
omissions.49 Given the reports of widespread atrocities by the
SAA and forces allied to them, the doctrine of indirect command
responsibility may bear more serious consequences to the
Russian intervention in Syria, as the overwhelming majority of
ground offensives on behalf of the Assad regime are conducted
by SAA, Iranian, and paramilitary troops friendly to both.50
46. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 25; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1600; Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7, May 25,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1163.
47. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 552; see also Prosecutor v. Tihomir
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (demonstrating that ICTY judgments are evidence
that this is a rule of customary international law where a commander or
superior who issues an order which does not explicitly require that a crime must
be committed may still be held liable for a crime if he issues an apparently
lawful order which both he and the recipient understand to implicitly authorize
the commission of a crime).
48. See generally Steve Rosenberg, Syria conflict: Russia’s Build-Up Looks
Long-Term, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-35391241 (describing the deployment of ground troops to guard air
bases and the fact that the Russian offensive combat operations are currently
limited to airstrikes and bombardments).
49. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 381–96.
50. See Martin Chulov, Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Patrick Wintour, Iran
Hails Victory in Aleppo as Shia Militias Boost Syria’s Bashar al-Assad,
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Furthermore, mounting evidence suggests that some SAA
offensives are conducted under the supervision of Russian
commanders or with the cooperation of Russian special forces
units.51
C. CONCLUSORY REMARKS
The UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force in the
absence of a corresponding Security Council authorization is
limited by a peremptory norm for a state to exercise its right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, as
well as by the lawful invitation of a legitimate state government
to intervene on its soil.52 Identifying what events qualify as an
“armed attack” and which entities constitute a state’s
“government” competent to invite intervention in cases of
internal armed conflicts, such as in Syria, are unresolved issues
within international law.53 The doctrines of state responsibility
and attribution provide that a state’s use of force in any
circumstance must be carried out in accordance with
international law, or that state risks incurring liability for its
breach of international obligations.54 Determining the legality of
the decision by Russian political leaders to intervene in Syria
and any potential corresponding legal liability the Russian State
might incur will be the first issue this Note will address.
Russian military personnel and their superiors may clearly
be held individually liable for the commission of international
crimes, but to what degree may Russian military commanders
be held liable as commanders for the actions of their Syrian and
Iranian allies? Can Russian military advisors and officers be
said to exercise the degree of control over Syrian military
personnel to attach command liability for their crimes? Russian
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/
iran-aleppo-syria-shia-militia.
51. See Siobhan O’Grady & Reid Standish, Russian Troops in Syria will
‘Stay Until the End’, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2015/10/22/russian-troops-in-syria-will-stay-until-the-end/ (speculating that an
SAA offensive in Latakia Province is being led by Russian generals).
52. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, art. 51; see also GILL & FLECK, supra note 18,
at 229.
53. Le Mon, supra note 5, at 748–49 (explaining that inconsistencies
between the effective control test and standards of belligerency test have
created incoherency in international law regarding invitations to intervene).
54. See Crawford, supra note 28, at 876. See generally 2001 ILC Report,
supra note 29.
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airstrikes in support of the military objectives of the SAA and its
allies, so long as they meet certain IHL standards of
proportionality, are not in and of themselves violations of
international law, but they still amount to collaboration with a
regime responsible for grave human rights violations and
present a new and uncertain collision of jus in bello
considerations with jus ad bellum justifications for going to war,
and may be resolved through the development of new
peremptory norms of international law.
II. ANALYSIS
The Russian intervention in Syria is likely permissible
under international law as individual self-defense, collective
self-defense, or under the legally vague intervention by
invitation exception to the non-intervention principle. The UN
Security Council is powerless to authorize the use of force in the
case of Syria, as Russia and China have vetoed any resolution
directed against the Assad government, leaving self-defense and
intervention by invitation as the only applicable justifications
available to Russia.55 Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the
customary and “[i]nherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs,”56 although the precise
definition of what constitutes an “armed attack” and whether
the Assad regime was subjected to one is unclear. The legality of
Russian airstrikes aiding the Assad controlled Syrian Arab
Republic (“SAR”) remain questionable, as the legal legitimacy of
the Assad government will control whether the SAR was legally
competent to invite the Russian intervention.57 Recent state
practice suggests that the Russian intervention is permissible as
individual self-defense as thousands of Russian citizens, who
have formerly served in Islamist groups which have carried out
major attacks on Russian soil, are currently serving within the
ranks of IS and other Islamist rebel groups.58 An analysis of
55. See Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to
International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014), http://www.the

guardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refersyria-international-criminal-court; James Reinl, Syria’s War and Veto-Wielding
UN Powerplays, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/in
depth/features/2015/09/syria-war-veto-wielding-powerplays150930064603153.html.
56. U.N. Charter art. 51.
57. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115.
58. See Kim Sengupta, Russia in Syria: President Putin’s Middle East
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recent developments in IHL reveals that the Russian
intervention in Syria is most likely justified under the
intervention by invitation exception to Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, as Russia has not justified its intervention on
humanitarian grounds, such as a responsibility to protect
civilians, nor could it do so in good faith given the extent of the
Assad regime’s atrocities.59
Notwithstanding the presumable legality of the
intervention, Russian civilian and military commanders will
very likely become criminally liable for the actions of their allies
in the SAA and other pro-Assad forces under command
responsibility.60 Less certain is the legality of the Russian
airstrikes assisting the SAA against opposition rebels as the
question of whether Russian commanders ordering the
airstrikes should be held accountable for assisting the military
forces responsible for grave violations of IHL and human rights
law remains undetermined. In respect to the latter question, a
new legal standard prohibiting military cooperation of any kind
with war criminals and human rights violators should be
developed, linking jus ad bellum considerations such as the
legality of a collective self-defense action with jus in bello
considerations regarding the legality of the actions of
participants in an armed conflict. This proposed linkage would
be limited in scope but would attribute liability on a State’s
civilian leadership for authorizing force, which rendered
military assistance to a party to an armed conflict, if those
leaders knew or had reason to know that grave IHL human
rights violations had been, or were being, committed by the
recipient of such military assistance. This section will address
the legality of the Russian intervention, identify the manner in
which Russian commanders will be likely held criminally liable
under IHL, and finally will outline the previously mentioned
proposed legal standard which would seek to limit invocations of
self-defense and intervention by invitation if the inviting state
Adventure Exposes Terrorist Threat Now Facing Moscow, INDEP. (Oct. 9, 2015),

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-in-syria-presidentputins-middle-east-adventure-exposes-terrorist-threat-now-facing-russiaa6688661.html; Adam Taylor, Why Being Chechen is a Badge of Honor for
Islamist Militants, WASH. POST (July 3, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/03/why-being-chechen-is-a-badge-ofhonor-for-islamist-militants/.
59. See Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep.
¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015).
60. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 381–96.
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has committed grave violations of IHL or human rights law
during the armed conflict at issue.
A. INTERVENTION BY INVITATION: THE RUSSIAN
INTERVENTION IS LIKELY LAWFUL, DUE TO THE
INVITATION OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND WILL
REMAIN LAWFUL SO LONG AS RUSSIA LIMITS ITS EXPRESS
PURPOSE TO FIGHTING TERRORIST GROUPS
Syria has been recognized as an independent state since
receiving its independence from France in 1945 and was a
founding member of the UN.61 Yet, the legal legitimacy of the
Assad government and its corresponding ability to invite foreign
intervention is in question given its loss of control over
considerable amounts of territory to opposition and Kurdish
rebel groups.62 The question of legitimacy is central to the
legality of the Russian intervention as only the legitimate
government may invite foreign intervention, and as the UN
General Assembly has stated: “[t]he act of calling in the forces of
a foreign State for the repression of internal disturbances is . . .
of so serious a character as to justify the expectation that no
uncertainty should be allowed to exist regarding the actual
presentation of such a request by a duly constituted
Government.”63 The SAR has not been formally recognized as
the legitimate government of Syria by most states, but a
government’s legal legitimacy is determined by the effective
control principle rather than by state recognition.64 For the
Russian intervention in Syria to be lawful as intervention by
invitation there must, firstly, be an invitation made by the
legitimate government of a “state” and, secondly, the scope of the
61. Activities of the Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/
depts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml (last visited March 1, 2017).
62. See Khayre, supra note 25, at 225. But see Le Mon, supra note 5, at
748–49.
63. Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Problem of Hung., ¶ 266, U.N. Doc.
A/3592 (1957) (concluding that there was insufficient evidence that a lawful
invitation by the Hungarian state had been made).
64. See THOMAS ERLICH & MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 138–40 (1993); see also Kerstin Odendahl, National and
International Legitimacy of Governments, 4 EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. 1 (2015)
(explaining that most states have withdrawn from recognizing or have never
recognized the Syrian Arab Republic yet Russia and China continue to); Brian
Rohan, Bashar Assad’s Battlefield Gains Cast Loud on Upcoming Syria Talks,
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/
19/assads-battlefield-gains-cast-cloud-on-upcoming-sy/?page=all.
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invited intervention must not violate the peremptory norm of
non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.65
Furthermore, collective self-defense requires, in addition to the
necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense
generally, an “armed attack,” the consent of the inviting state to
the presence of foreign military troops, and a request for help.66
In brief, the legality of the intervention hinges on the legitimacy
of the SAR, the nature of its internal armed conflict, and the
state of IHL given recent state practice in the global War on
Terrorism.
1. State Recognition and Effective Control in Internal
Armed Conflict: Recent State Practice on Intervention by
Invitation Favors Classifying the Russian Intervention
as Permissible under IHL
The legal determination of whether a political entity
constitutes a “state” in international law is complex but the
declaratory view of statehood, espoused in the 1933 Montevideo
Convention, currently predominates.67 Under the standards of
that treaty it is debatable whether Syria remains a “state” or
whether it is in the process of dissolution into several
independent states, Syria arguably possesses a permanent
population and defined territory but it has no “government”
which exercises effective control over all of its territory, even
though the Assad-led SAR continues to represent Syria in the
65. See Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 19, at 861 (“Louise DoswaldBeck referred to the principles of self-determination and non-interference in the
internal affairs of states to conclude that ‘there is, at the least, a very serious
doubt whether a State may validly aid another government to suppress a
rebellion, particularly if the rebellion is widespread and seriously aimed at the
overthrow of the incumbent regime.’”).
66. See Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in
Georgia, Vol. II, at 286 (Sept. 2009), http://echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_
38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf (explaining that self-defense cannot be legitimate
without meeting all its conditions); see also Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14,
¶¶ 297, 313 (explaining necessity and proportionality as requirements for
legitimate self-defense).
67. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (“The state as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity
to enter into relations with the other states.”); see also Robert D. Sloane, The
Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet , 16
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107, 117 (2002) (explaining that the declaratory view
[Montevideo Convention] of recognition predominates in international law).
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UN and can be said to have the capacity to enter into foreign
relations on behalf of Syria.68 International law traditionally
allowed only a government which exercised effective (de facto)
control over their State’s territory to invite foreign nations to
intervene under certain conditions, including in suppressing an
insurgency, but conversely in states of internal conflict rebel
forces could not invite such interventions unless they controlled
enough territory to constitute “a belligerency.”69
While the belligerency analysis has fallen out of favor, in
theory the effective control test still determines the legitimacy
of whether a political entity represents the “government” of a
state. Interpreting “effective control” narrowly to mean anything
less than undisputed de facto governmental authority over a
nation’s internal territory would bar any nation in the midst of
a civil war from inviting foreign intervention, and some legal
scholars have stated that control of most of the national territory
is sufficient to meet the effective control test.70 Recent state
practice and the UN do not endorse such a narrow view of the
effective control test within customary international law, and in
several recent cases the UN has either acquiesced to or implicitly
endorsed interventions in situations of civil war which would
seem to violate the test.71
In 2013, French forces launched Operation Serval at the
invitation of the Malian government and drove out Islamist
rebels, which had occupied over half of Mali’s territory, and, in
spite of a lack of an explicit Security Council authorization, the
UN expressed its view that the intervention was conducted in
accordance with international law.72 Operation Serval was
68. See generally Interview with Fabrice Balanche, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (Jan. 30, 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/
syriaincrisis/?fa=58875 (“The Syrian government [as of 1/30/2015] controls
around 50 percent of the territory, but it rules between 55 and 72 percent of the
population left inside Syria. The rebels control 45 percent of the territory and
17–34 percent of the population, while the Kurds control no more than 5 percent
of the territory with 5–10 percent of the population.”).
69. ERLICH & O’CONNELL, supra note 64, at 138–40.
70. See Dinstein, supra note 5, at 888 (“The fact that the Taliban regime
was in control of most of the territory of Afghanistan meant that—recognized
or not—it was the de facto Government, and the regime’s actions had to ‘be
treated as the actions of the state of Afghanistan.’”).
71. See Le Mon, supra note 5, at 790–91 (“The positive reaction of the
international community to long-term Russian intervention [in Tajikistan’s
Civil War], an intervention that the standards of belligerency strictly would
have prohibited, displays the continued dissonance between these principles of
law and post-Charter state action.”).
72. See Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 19, at 865–67.
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distinguishable from the Russian intervention, in that the
invitation for the French to intervene came from a government
whose legal legitimacy no nation had disputed, and because the
French military limited their focus solely to groups classified as
terrorist organizations by the UN.73 This unconditioned UN
approval of Operation Serval, in spite of prior French misgivings
about intervening at the invitation of the Central African
Republic during a period of internal unrest,74 indicate that even
a government which controls less than half of the physical
territory of a state may invite a foreign army to destroy
designated terrorist groups on its own soil under international
law.75 Nevertheless, such recent state practice demonstrates the
unsettled state of international law on the legitimacy of
governments in times of internal conflict as well as the manner
in which the non-intervention principle may be skirted by
classifying the opponents of an inviting state as terrorist groups,
which both Russia and the SAR have done.76
2. Non-Intervention and the War on Terrorism: It is Likely
that the Assad Regime Remains the Government of the
State of Syria, and Lawfully Requested Russian Military
Assistance
Syria is politically dominated by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath
Party.77 Since elements of that party seized control of the Syrian
government in 1963, and since Ba’athist General Hafez al-Assad
took control of the government during the Corrective Revolution
of November 13, 1970, Syria has been ruled by the Assad family,
members of the minority Alawite sect of Shia Islam.78 Hafez alAssad ruled until his death in 2000 whereby his son Bashar
succeeded him as President and as the head of the ruling Ba’ath
Party. And although the SAR Constitution was revised in 2012
to leave the exercise of the SAR’s sovereignty to “[t]he people,”

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865–67; see also Le Mon, supra note 5, at 790–91.
See Putin: No Need to Distinguish Between ‘Moderate’ & Other
Terrorists, RUSS. TODAY (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.rt.com/news/319405putin-valdai-discussion-club/.
77. See Michael Bröning, The Sturdy House that Assad Built: Why
Damascus is Not Cairo, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/syria/2011-03-07/sturdy-house-assad-built.
78. See id.
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the SAR retains single party authoritarian rule.79 Until the
uprisings of 2011, and their escalation into an internal armed
conflict, the SAR had continuously exerted control over the
territory within the defined geographic boundaries of Syria, with
the exception of a series of revolts led by Islamist political parties
between 1979 and 1982 and a brief period of rioting in certain
Kurdish populated cities in 2004, both of which were swiftly
crushed by the SAA.80 Due to the lack of political unity between
armed opposition groups in the Syrian Civil War at the present
time, the SAR likely remains the legitimate government of Syria
notwithstanding its substantial loss of territorial control as a
result of the civil war.81 Despite the SAR exerting control of only
a fraction of the territory of Syria, that zone of territorial control
includes most of Syria’s major cities, as well as the majority of
the Syrian population, many of whom support the Assad
regime.82 The SAR was expelled from multiple regional
organizations following the uprising, including the Arab League,
which chose instead to seat members of the Syrian opposition
rebel groups; however, the SAR government retains its
representation within the UN and has been repeatedly invited
to represent itself in peace talks regarding the conflict.83 Iran, a
79. Id.; see also Article 2, Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic of 2012
(Amended to remove reference to the Ba’ath Party as the leader of the people
and stating that “[s]overeignty is an attribute of the people; and no individual
or group may claim sovereignty. Sovereignty shall be based on the principle of
the rule of the people by the people and for the people; The People shall exercise
their sovereignty within the aspects and limits prescribed in the Constitution.”),
http://sana.sy/en/?page_id=1489.
80. See Bröning, supra note 77; see also Robert Fisk, Freedom, Democracy
and Human Rights in Syria, INDEP. (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.independent.
co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-freedom-democracy-and-humanrights-in-syria-2080463.html (explaining the eventual suppression of a series of
Islamist revolts in the 1982 Hama massacre); Albert Aji, Tension Unabated
After Riots in Syria, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 16, 2004), http://archive.boston.com/
news/world/middleeast/articles/2004/03/16/tension_unabated_after_riots_in_sy
ria/.
81. See Bröning, supra note 77; see generally Le Mon, supra note 5.
82. See ORB INT’L, Syria Public Opinion – July 2015, https://www.orbinternational.com/perch/resources/syriadata.pdf (showing that 47% said Assad
was a somewhat or completely positive influence).
83. Neil McFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crack
down-on-protesters.html; Regional Group Votes to Suspend Syria; Rebels Claim
downing of Jet, CNN (Aug. 14, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/13/
world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html?hpt=hp_t1;
Syria
Suspends
its
Membership in Mediterranean Union, XINHUA (Dec. 2, 2011), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-12/01/c_131282989.htm;
Syrian
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principal ally of Assad and the SAR which has sent thousands of
troops to fight against opposition rebels, notably was also given
a seat in recent peace negotiations.84 These facts tend to show
that the SAR was considered the de facto government of a state
before the uprising began in 2011 and has likely remained one
since, as no singular opposition group has exceeded its power or
authority within the territorial boundaries of the Syrian
nation.85 Indeed the UN Security Council has in at least one
instance announced that a government which had lost effective
territorial control in a civil war nevertheless possessed sovereign
rights over all territory within its national borders, stating that
the South African occupation of rebel-controlled territory within
Angola violated the non-intervention principle.86 Since the
Syrian invitation came from the highest levels of the SAR
government it is very likely that, if the SAR is the legitimate
government, its request to Russia for military assistance was
properly conducted in accordance with the law of armed conflict
(jus ad bellum).87
Governments exerting effective (de facto) control over a
state’s territory may invite foreign troops onto their own soil.
Howecer, identifying the conditions under which a state may
invite another state to intervene in its own internal armed
conflict, where the sovereign authority of a government to invite
foreign intervention weakens as it loses control over territory to
rebel groups, is a separate consideration which is supplied with

Opposition Takes Arab League Seat, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.the

guardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/syrian-opposition-appeals-nato-support.
84. Thomas Erdbrink et. al., After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on
War in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/29/world/middleeast/syria-talks-vienna-iran.html.
85. See Who Has Gained Ground in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/30/world/middleeast/syriacontrol-map-isis-rebels-airstrikes.html.
86. See S.C. Res. 602, ¶ 1 (Nov. 25, 1987) (“Strongly condemns [South
Africa] for its continued and intensified acts of aggression against [the MPLAcontrolled government in Angola] as well as its continuing occupation of parts
of that State, which constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Angola.”).
87. See Walid Al-Moualem, Syrian Arab Republic, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Statement at 70 th Session of the
U.N. General Assembly (Oct. 2, 2015), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/
files/gastatements/70/70_SY_en.pdf; Corky Siemaszko, Syrian Government
Invites Russia to Send in Ground Troops to Protect Assad Regime from ISIS ,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/
russia-launches-attacks-syria-day-article-1.2382933.
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no clear answer.88 State practice has generally evidenced
customary IHL principles forbidding intervention in another
nation’s civil war in order to decide the outcome of that war, but
if the scope of such interventions is strictly limited to clearly
defined purposes such as fighting terrorism, it may nevertheless
be permissible under IHL.89 The 2009 European Union Fact
Finding Mission in Georgia ruled that South Ossetia, a territory
part of Georgia but recognized as a state by Russia, was not
legally capable of inviting Russia to militarily intervene against
Georgia.90 That commission identified three separate legal
standards on intervention by invitation: the doctrine of
asymmetry, where “[o]nly the established and internationally
recognized government can pronounce an invitation with legal
effect;” the doctrine of negative equality, which means to
“[a]cknowledge that in a state of civil war, none of the competing
factions can be said to be effective, stable, and legitimate,” so
that none is competent to invite outside intervention; and the
doctrine of positive equality, which holds that outside
intervention is permissible on behalf of either party to a civil war
“[f]rom that moment on when in an internal war the control of
the state’s territory is divided between the warring parties.”91
The doctrine of asymmetry has been the traditional standard
under international law, yet, in Syria’s case it provides little
assistance in determining whether the invitation was lawful, as
though the Assad family-led SAR has been the “established”
government of Syria for over four decades, is it not formally
internationally recognized by most states.92
In its effective control over territory within Syria’s borders,
the SAR certainly possesses much more authority as an
“established and internationally recognized government” than
did the South Ossetian authorities in 2008, and at least as much
authority as the collapsing Malian government which invited the
88. See generally Le Mon, supra note 5 (explaining the effective control
principle and the uncertain state of international law regarding statehood in
periods of civil unrest).
89. See Bannelier & Christakis, supra note 19, at 864 (“[m]ilitary
assistance on request is perfectly legal in a series of cases, including the
hypothesis of joint fight against terrorism.”).
90. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in
Georgia, Vol. I, 1–33, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_
iiffmgc_report.pdf.
91. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in
Georgia, Vol. II, supra note 66, at 276–80.
92. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 64 (explaining the lack of
international recognition of the Syria Arab Republic).
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French intervention in 2013.93 As evidence of this, the ICJ
determined in Nicaragua v. US that the dictatorial regime in El
Salvador, which had been established by a military coup less
than ten years before that decision, and which faced an internal
armed conflict throughout the 1980’s, would have been
competent to invite foreign intervention under collective selfdefense in the event of an “armed attack.”94 It is also worth
noting that the composition of opposition rebels has shifted
dramatically since the start of the war with ISIL entering the
conflict from Iraq as outsiders to the initially nationalist
uprising, and quickly becoming the most successful rebel group
within Syria and Iraq.95 The rule of non-intervention in another
state’s internal armed conflict is related to the peremptory norm
of self-determination, whereby a distinct populace may
determine their own political destiny by taking up arms against
their own government, yet ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusrah are
organizations led by outsiders with no direct connection to the
Syrian nationalist rebel groups which initiated the rebellion.96
Given this new state of affairs, it is debatable whether the
considerable foreign state support for such groups, including
allegations of harboring rebel groups and allowing them to
93. See Who’s Who in the Syria Conflict, AL MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2017),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/01/syria-conflict-players.html (“The
government controls 34 percent of Syria’s territory, including key cities such as
Damascus and second city Aleppo”).
94. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 230.
95. See generally Samia Nakhoul, Saddam’s Former Army is Secret of
Baghdadi’s Success, REUTERS (June 16, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insight-idUSKBN0OW1VN20150616;
see
also Patrick Cockburn, Whose Side is Turkey On?, 36 LONDON REV. BOOKS 8, 9
(2014) (“This was a political problem for the US, as Joe Biden revealed to the
embarrassment of the administration in a talk at Harvard on 2 October. He said
that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had promoted ‘a proxy Sunni-Shia war’
in Syria and ‘poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of
tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad—except that the
people who were being supplied were al-Nusra and al-Qaida and the extremist
element of jihadis coming from other parts of the world’. He admitted that the
moderate Syrian rebels, supposedly central to US policy in Syria, were a
negligible military force.”).
96. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 164 (Dec. 19) (noting that the
Nicaragua case had “made it clear that the principle of non-intervention
prohibits a State ‘to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed
force, in support of an internal opposition in another state’”); see also U.N.
Charter art. 1, ¶ 2 (“The Purposes of the United Nations are . . . To develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace.”).
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attack SAR targets in cross-border operations, could
“internationalize” Syria’s internal armed conflict and alter the
applicability of the non-intervention principle to the Russian
intervention by invitation.97
B. SELF-DEFENSE: THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION MAY BE
PERMISSIBLE UNDER IHL AS INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, BUT NOT AS ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE
1. Collective Self-Defense May Justify the Russian
Intervention if the Conduct of Turkey in Assisting Syrian
Rebels Rose to the Level of an “Armed Attack” Against
the Syrian Arab Republic
Given the likelihood that the SAR continues to remain a
“state,” the element of international recognition it lacks should
not defeat its competency to lawfully invite another nation to
intervene in its conflict. However, even assuming that the SAR
remains the legitimate government of Syria, Russia can only
justify this intervention as collective self-defense if the SAR was
subject to an “armed attack.”98A precise legal definition of
“armed attack” has remained elusive, but typically such an
attack would come from the conventional military forces of
another state, yet there is strong evidence in customary IHL that
armed irregular groups can initiate armed attacks against states
provided those groups are backed by another state and provided
the attack is similar in gravity to those launched by conventional
forces.99 Imputing the conduct of such irregular groups to
another state is difficult; the Nicaragua v. United States
attribution standard requiring evidentiary proof that a state
“had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed,”
and the mere provision of arms to opposition groups in another

97. See UNHRC Report, supra note 3, ¶ 165 (“The livelihood of the Syrian
population is subverted daily by the increasingly internationalized nature of
this non-international armed conflict, as well as the ferocity of confrontations
at the ground level, compounded by the spread of extremism.”).
98. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 211.
99. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(g) (Dec. 14, 1974) (“The sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to
the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”).
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country was held by the ICJ not to constitute an “armed
attack.”100
In the Syrian Civil War, the military forces of the SAR have
been waging conventional and asymmetric warfare against
numerous Islamist and nationalist insurgent groups, who often
possess armaments and equipment superior to that of the SAA,
and several of these groups are backed by foreign nations
seeking the SAR’s overthrow.101 The SAA has fought these
foreign backed insurgents in conventional battles, such as the
Siege of Zabadani, with resulting casualties rivaling those that
the United States military experienced in the Vietnam War.102
The war has resulted in the deaths of over 250,000 people,
including soldiers, rebels, and civilians, and in the forced
displacement of millions of Syrian citizens.103
Over the course of the war, Turkey has invaded Syria
briefly, shelled the Syrian town of Kobani, and there is mounting
evidence that the Turkish government or Turkish intelligence
services has collaborated with IS in cross-border attacks against
Syrian Kurdish groups.104 Moreover, there is strong evidence
100. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (“All the forms of United
States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the
respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not
in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed
or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be
committed by members of the contras without the control of the United
States.”); id. at ¶ 230.
101. Arab League Allows Members to Arm Rebels and Offers Seat to
Opposition, AL BAWABA NEWS (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.albawaba.com/news/
arab-league-syria-475662; Tara McKelvey, Arming Syrian rebels: Where the
US
Went
Wrong,
BBC
NEWS
(Oct.
10,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408.
102. See generally Syrian Army, Hezbollah Capture 17 Militants in
Zabadani, AL BAWABA NEWS (July 27, 2015), http://www.albawaba.com/
news/syrian-army-hezbollah-capture-17-militants-zabadani-723810
(explaining that 28 SAA and 15 allied Hezbollah were killed in Zabadani in first
three weeks of assault ); see also Zabadani Battles Have Claimed over 400
Rebels, 60 Hezbollah Fighters, DAILY STAR NEWS: LEBANON (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-04/313930zabadani-battles-have-claimed-over-400-rebels-60-hezbollah-fighters.ashx.
103. See Chris York & George Bowden, Syria Civil War Death Toll Paints a
Horrifyingly Complex Picture, HUFFINGTON POST UK (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/10/31/syrian-civil-war-death_n_8440378.html.
104. See generally Barney Guiton, ‘ISIS Sees Turkey as Its Ally’: Former
Islamic State Member Reveals Turkish Army Cooperation, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 7,
2014), http://europe.newsweek.com/isis-and-turkey-cooperate-destroy-kurdsformer-isis-member-reveals-turkish-282920?rx=us; Kurdish Forces Accuse
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that Turkey has openly allowed thousands of foreign nationals
to pass through its borders and cross into Syria in order to join
IS and other opposition rebel groups, and, in at least one battle,
Turkey is suspected of harboring opposition rebels on its
territory.105 If the ICJ holding in Nicaragua v. US accurately
states customary IHL, excluding from the definition of “armed
attack” arming and aiding rebels but including within such
definition the mining of another state’s harbors,106 then the
Turkish Army’s shelling of Kurdish-controlled Kobani or the
Turkish government’s allowance of rebel groups to use its
territory to stage cross-border attacks would seem to fall under
the definition of “armed attack.” ICJ precedent held that the
mere provision of arms to opposition groups in another nation
was not enough to constitute an armed attack; however, that
decision was rendered in the context of the conflict between
Nicaragua and El Salvador, which was a conflict with a lesser
death toll and the provision of much less sophisticated weaponry
than in Syria today.107 Indeed, the allegations of Turkey
Turkey of Launching Pro-ISIS Operations in Kobane, ARA NEWS (Aug. 1, 2015),

http://aranews.net/2015/08/kurdish-forces-acuse-turkey-of-launching-pro-isisoperations-in-kobane/; Alex MacDonald, Turkey ‘Shells Kobane’ as KurdishArab Forces Advance on Strategic Town, MIDDLE EAST EYE, (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-military-allegedly-shell-kobaneypg-and-arabs-advances-strategic-town-1894959234; Syria Crisis: IS Makes
Deadly Return to Kobane, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-33266399.
105. See UN Says ‘25,000 Foreign Fighters’ Joined Islamist Militants, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541?
utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&ut
m_campaign=2014_The%20Middle%20East%20Daily;
Natasha Bertrand,
Senior Western Official: Links Between Turkey and ISIS are Now ‘Undeniable’,
YAHOO! (July 28, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/links-between-turkeyisis-now-195700510.html (“Ankara officially ended its loose border policy last
year, but not before its southern frontier became a transit point for cheap oil,
weapons, foreign fighters, and pillaged antiquities.”); Patrick Cockburn, Whose
Side Is Turkey on?, 36 LONDON REV. BOOKS No. 21, 8-10 (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-cockburn/whose-side-is-turkey-on (“When
Syrian rebels led by al-Nusra captured the Armenian town of Kassab in Syrian
government-held territory early this year, it seemed that the Turks had allowed
them to operate from inside Turkish territory.”).
106. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 115, 230–31.
107. Id. ¶¶ 230–31; see also Richard Johnson, Syrian Rebels Acquire U.S.
Made Antitank Missiles, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/apps/g/page/world/syrian-rebels-acquire-us-made-antitankmissiles/980/; Mark Mazzetti & Matt Apuzzo, Saudi Arabia, the CIA and the
Arming of Syrian Rebels, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.irish
times.com/news/world/us/saudi-arabia-the-cia-and-the-arming-of-syrianrebels-1.2508641; U.N. Syria Chemical Weapons Probe Points to Sarin
Exposure; Rebel Use Doubted, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.japan
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harboring opposition rebels which launch cross-border military
style attacks, if substantiated by evidence, should indicate that
the SAR suffered an “armed attack” sufficient to trigger Russia’s
right to exercise collective self-defense on behalf of the SAR. This
conclusion seems inescapable in light of the fact that the United
States invasion of Afghanistan, justified by the U.S.-led coalition
as individual or collective self-defense, was deemed permissible
under IHL without a prior UN Security Council authorization
against an arguably non-state actor (the Taliban) on a novel
theory of being an accomplice in a non-state actor’s (al-Qaeda)
armed attack.108
2. Chechen Rebels Who Have Conducted Terrorist Attacks
Against Russia Are
Heavily Represented Among the
Syrian Rebels, Potentially Justifying the Russian
Intervention as Individual Self-Defense
Russia has dealt with Chechen and Dagestani separatist
movements and insurgencies since the Russian Empire
conquered the Northern Caucasus region in the early 19th
century, and within the last twenty-five years it has fought two
wars to suppress armed Islamist insurrections in Chechnya and
Dagestan. Islamist groups affiliated with these separatist
movements have conducted multiple terrorist attacks against
civilian targets within Russia, resulting in massive casualties.109
times.co.jp/news/2016/01/05/world/u-n-syria-chemical-weapons-probe-pointssarin-exposure-rebel-use-doubted/#.Vq2hkVLaQ5w (regime suspected of
continuing to use chemical weapons).
108. See Ben Smith & Arabella Thorp, The Legal Basis for the Invasion of
Afghanistan, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/5340 (Feb. 26,
2010), at 4–5.
109. See Greg Myre, Warlord Becoming Most Feared Man In Russia,
SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 15, 1999), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=19990915&slug=2983256 (apartment bombings kill over 250);
John B. Dunlop, The October 2002 Moscow Hostage-Taking Incident, RADIO
FREE EUR. (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342392.html
(over 200 dead in theater hostage crisis); Volgograd Railway Station Blast,
LIVE UPDATES, RT (Dec. 29, 2013), https://www.rt.com/news/volgogradsuicide-bombing-updates-940/ (32 killed in suicide bombings); Chloe Arnold,
Beslan Mothers’ Futile Quest for Relief, BBC NEWS (June 4, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4608785.stm (over 320 dead in school hostage
crisis); Richard Galpin, Russia Train crash ‘Caused by Bomb’, BBC NEWS (Nov.
28, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8383960.stm (train bombing killed
29); Moscow Bombing: Carnage at Russia’s Domodedovo Airport, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12268662 (over 35 dead
in train bombing); Two Blasts in Dagestan: 14 Dead, 87 Injured, RUSS. TODAY

592

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2

Thousands of militants serving in anti-Assad rebel groups
include peoples from the Caucasus who are Russian citizens,
many of whom are also members of Islamist insurgent groups
which have carried out terrorist attacks on Russian civilian and
military targets.110 Shortly after the Russian intervention
began, ISIL successfully downed a Russian commercial airliner
flying over Egypt, killing 224 people—including dozens of
Russian citizens—and demonstrating the continuing threat
Russia faces from Islamist terror groups.111 The large presence
of Chechen fighters in Syria within groups like ISIL has
therefore heightened the Russian interest in the outcome of the
Syrian conflict, and may justify the Russian intervention on
individual self-defense grounds should Russia have been
subjected to an “armed attack” by those groups.112
As mentioned above, the UN Charter prohibits the use of
force in the absence of a Security Council authorization or a
justification under self-defense.113 To invoke individual or
collective self-defense, the ICJ held in Nicaragua v. United
States that a nation must have sustained an “armed attack,” and
a recent international claims decision deemed minor border
clashes between the conventional troops of two states to not
qualify as armed attacks.114 In Nicaragua v. United States, the
ICJ held that El Salvador had not been subjected to an “armed
attack,” yet the court also stated that it lacked evidence of direct
(May 3, 2012), https://www.rt.com/news/mahachkala-explosions-five-dead-547/;
Russia Chechnya: Deadly Rebel Attack Rocks Grozny, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30323751 (dozens of Russian
soldiers and policemen killed in gun battle with Chechen Emirate militants);
Five Killed in Suicide Bombing in Chechen Capital, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29498909.
110. See Lidia Kelley, Moscow Says About 2,400 Russians Fighting with
Islamic State: RIA, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/09/18/us-mideast-crisis-russia-islamic-state-idUSKCN0RI0PG20150918.
111. Gianluca Mezzofiore, Isis Claims ‘Schweppes Can Bomb’ Blew Up
Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 in Egypt’s Sinai - Dabiq, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov.
18,
2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-claim-schweppes-can-bomb-blewrussian-metrojet-flight-9268-egypts-sinai-dabiq-1529374 (explaining that IS
claims responsibility for deadliest airliner attack in Russian history).
112. See supra Section I.A.1.; see also supra Section II.B.1.
113. See supra Section I.A.1.; see also supra Section II.B.1.
114. See generally Partial Award on the Jus Ad Bellum Eth.’s Claims 1–8
(Eth. v. Eri.), 26 R.I.A.A. 457, 465 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2015) (“As the text
of Article 51 of the Charter makes clear, the predicate for a valid claim of selfdefense under the Charter is that the party resorting to force has been subjected
to an armed attack. Localized border encounters between small infantry units,
even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for
purposes of the Charter.”).
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Nicaraguan involvement in the El Salvador’s Civil War.115 In
either case, the issue of an “armed attack” related to the direct
involvement of a state, whereas neither ISIL nor their Chechen
Islamist allies receive any direct state support nor could either
be called a state.116 Given these holdings it would seem unlikely
that several major terrorist attacks against Russian civilians by
stateless militant groups, supported openly by no other state,
would fit the conventional definition of “armed attack.” Yet a
comparison to the almost unquestioned legal basis of the United
States invasion and occupation of Afghanistan raises questions
about how closely related an irregular terrorist group must be to
a state sponsor to make a terrorist attack an “armed attack” as
defined by the ICJ.117
The United States Ambassador to the UN legally justified
the American invasion of Afghanistan prior to UN Security
Council authorization by invoking the nation’s inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense under Article 51, on the
basis of al-Qaeda’s relationship to the Taliban regime, and the
UN Security Council subsequently issued a resolution
authorizing the continuing use of force in Afghanistan.118 In fact,
the Taliban regime was engaged in a brutal civil war from the

115. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 230–32.
116. See Bill Roggio, Chechen Commander in Syria Pledges to Islamic
Caucasus Emirate, LONG WAR J. (July 10, 2015), http://www.longwar
journal.org/archives/2015/07/chechen-commander-in-syria-pledges-to-islamiccaucasus-emirates.php; Mairbek Vatchagaev, Caucasus Emirate Reverses
Position on Syrian Jihad, THE JAMESTOWN FOUND. (June 28, 2013),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41091&tx
_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=e52244ad41ac68df14f5f09a58799d97#.Vq2w1LaQ5y (describing the tension between Syrian and Chechen rebel groups).
117. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 190–191 (explaining that
customary IL forbids organizing irregular groups for the purpose of incursions
into another state’s territory and in supporting groups in another state’s
internal conflict for the purpose of overthrowing that government).
118. Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter Dated 7 October 2001
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (Oct. 7 2001) (“From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda
organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack
innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and
interests in the United States and abroad. In response to these attacks, and in
accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence,
United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter
further attacks on the United States.”); see also S.C. Res. 1386, ¶ 3 (Dec. 20,
2001) (“Authorizes the Member States participating in the International
Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its
mandate . . . .”); see also Smith & Thorp, supra note 108, at 4–5.
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time of its formation and never exerted effective control over all
of the territory of Afghanistan.119 The Taliban led regime was
never internationally recognized as the legitimate government
of Afghanistan as most nations continued to view the ousted
Islamic State of Afghanistan and its Northern Alliance rebel
coalition, which controlled a significant portion of Afghanistan
up until the U.S. invasion, as the legitimate government.120 This
begs a series of questions: if a nation must suffer an “armed
attack” to justify individual self-defense, and if an “armed
attack” can only be initiated by conventional or irregular forces
directed by a “State,” then how could the Taliban launch an
“armed attack” against the United States if they never exerted
the effective control over Afghanistan necessary to constitute a
“state?”121 If no “armed attack” occurred under this strict ICJ
definition, then on what basis in IHL is the American
intervention in and occupation of Afghanistan justified? If the
international community is willing to accept the American
intervention as permissible without addressing this void in legal
justification, then the Russian intervention in Syria would
presumably also be permissible, if directed explicitly against
Chechen insurgent groups and their allies, such as ISIL, given
state practice in the aforementioned Angola, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, and Mali interventions.
3. Due to the Scope of Russian Operations the Russian
Intervention Likely Cannot Be Justified as Anticipatory
Self-Defense
If, however, it cannot be said that the Chechen Islamist
terrorist attacks on Russia rose to the level of “armed attacks,”
Russia may have to turn to preemptive warfare as a justification
119. See Who are the Northern Alliance? , BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm; see also sources cited infra
note 132.
120. ADRIAN GUELKE, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL DISORDER: POLITICAL
VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, at 55 (1st ed. 2006) (explaining that
the Taliban achieved recognition only from the KSA, Pakistan, and the UAE);
Afghanistan & the United Nations, UN, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/
afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml (Islamic State of Afghanistan remained
recognized until 2001 when Afghanistan transitioned to a new government);
Zachary Laub, The Taliban in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 4,
2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551 (explaining
that 10% of Afghanistan remained in Northern Alliance control at the time of
the United States invasion).
121. See supra Section II.A.
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for the intervention. Notably the terrorist attacks of Chechen
and Dagestani Islamic insurgent groups differ from the
Afghanistan model in that Chechnya and Dagestan are a part of
Russia, and as such, the spread of these militants into opposition
rebel groups in Syria could be characterized as the spread of nonstate parties to Russia’s internal armed conflict into Syria’s
internal armed conflict, rather than an “armed attack” from a
foreign terrorist group with a state sponsor.122 The Syrian
government, as the result of sustaining heavy casualties and
defections within the military, was unable to defeat these jihadi
groups and was unable to make significant military progress
until Iranian and Russian assistance increased.123 Given the
helpless state of the SAR to suppress these powerful rebel
groups, which include terrorist groups whose members have
committed acts of mass murder against Russian citizens in
Russia and abroad, the Russian intervention could potentially
be justified as anticipatory self-defense.124
Peremptory norms of IHL hold that a pre-emptive attack or
defensive operation must meet the necessity and proportionality
122. See Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/58, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2000/58 (Apr. 25, 2000) (explaining the Second Chechen War in
terms of obligations under IHL, which by implication defined that war was an
internal armed conflict); Valery Dzutsati, Experts: Russia’s Crackdown on

Salafists at Home and Military Campaign in Syria Could Destabilize North
Caucasus, JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45253&tx_ttnews[backPid]=228&cHash=758db67
5522151c461e01282ed6ff790#.VwBotXr4D7J; Valery Dzutsati, International
Crisis Group: Russia Deliberately ‘Exported’ Jihadis to Middle East,
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.jamestown.org/regions/middle
east/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45230&tx_ttnews[backPid]=49&cHash=0c54c
ad59ae23fb26423b694f412bafc#.VwBpGHr4D7I (explaining reports alleging a
Russian policy of encouraging Islamic militants to leave the Caucasus region
and go to Syria).
123. See Jay Solomon & Sam Dagher, Russia, Iran Seen Coordinating on
Defense of Assad Regime in Syria, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2015, 2:56 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-iran-seen-coordinating-on-defense-of-assadregime-in-syria-1442856556; Dr. Azeem Ibrahim, Russia Is Clearing the Decks
for Assad, AL-ARABIYA NEWS (Jan. 3, 2016), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/
views/news/middle-east/2016/01/03/Russia-is-clearing-the-decks-forAssad.html.
124. See generally James Dever & John Dever, Making Waves: Refitting the
Caroline Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165,
174 (2013) (discussing what constitutes a permissible use of force in an
anticipation of an attack on a state); see also sources cited supra note 109
(describing Chechen jihadi group attacks on Russian soil); Kelley, supra note
110 (stating migrants from Middle East pose “great threat” to Russia); sources
cited supra note 116 (explaining the involvement of Chechens in Syrian jihadi
video addresses).
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requirements.125 The necessity doctrine holds that a government
seeking to employ anticipatory self-defense must demonstrate “a
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”126 The
proportionality doctrine for anticipatory self-defense limits the
range and gravity of military action available and obligated the
soldiers conducting any such operations to do “nothing
unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it.”127 Assuming the presence of Chechen
insurgents is a grave and imminent threat to Russian security
and assuming that the necessity requirement is thereby met, the
scope of the Russian military intervention will be restricted by
proportionality to attacking only those groups which had
prompted that “necessity of self-defence.”128 This would
presumably limit available targets to the Chechen insurgent
groups in Syria and their direct allies such as ISIL, yet Russian
airstrikes have been conducted predominantly against Western
backed rebels such as the Free Syrian Army until the more
recent offensive against ISIL in Palmyra.129 Even recognizing
that most groups fighting Assad in Syria are often closer to ISIL
in ideology than they are to their secular Western patrons,
opposition rebel groups aligned with the Free Syrian Army are
generally enemies of hardline Islamist groups like Jabhat alNusra unless military necessity dictates that they fight
together.130 The Russian airstrikes have therefore likely
125. See ICRC, Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, CUSTOMARY IHL
DATABASE,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_
rule14 (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (“The principle of proportionality in attack is
codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, and repeated in Article 57.”);
Military Necessity, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/
casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2017) (“The principle of military necessity is, like the related principle of
proportionality, an essential component of international humanitarian law. The
‘principle of military necessity’ permits measures which are actually necessary
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by
international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the only
legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other
parties to the conflict.”).
126. Dever & Dever, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See ‘More than 90%’ of Russian Airstrikes in Syria Have Not Targeted
Isis, US Says, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:39 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/oct/07/russia-airstrikes-syria-not-targetting-isis.
130. See Hardline Islamists Among Syria’s Moderate Opposition, David
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exceeded the scope of the necessity doctrine by attacking groups
unrelated to Chechen insurgents or their Islamist allies in ISIL
and Jabhat al-Nusra, making the intervention unjustifiable as
anticipatory self-defense.
C. STATE RESPONSIBILITY MAY INCULPATE THE RUSSIAN
STATE AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY MAY INCULPATE
RUSSIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMANDERS AS A
RESULT OF THE SYRIAN INTERVENTION
IHL jus in bello imposes stringent regulations on the
methods Russian military forces, and any forces subordinate to
Russian commanders, employ in their operations. IHL imposes
obligations on combatants in an armed conflict to distinguish
civilians from enemy combatants, to target only legitimate
military objectives, and to prepare and execute attacks on such
objectives so that any resulting civilian casualties and damage
to civilian property is not disproportionate to the military
advantage gained.131 Russian Defense Ministry Spokesmen
Major General Igor Konashenkov has stated that “[o]ur aviation
in Syria does not target populated localities,” yet there is ample
evidence of Russian bombings of densely populated areas in
rebel-controlled territory, which have resulted in hundreds of
civilian casualties.132 There is also mounting but unconfirmed
evidence of Russian generals directing SAA offensives, and of
Russian combat troops directly participating in such
Cameron Concedes, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.belfast

telegraph.co.uk/news/uk/hardline-islamists-among-syrias-moderateopposition-david-cameron-concedes-34358936.html; David Bromwich, Syria,
the Times and the Mystery of the “Moderate Rebels”, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
2, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/syria-thetimes-and-myste_b_8236164.html (discussing speculations that Russia’s entry
into the war will “push ‘Independent Islamists’ to ally themselves with alNusra, and hence presumably will take them a degree closer to ISIS”).
131. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 250; see also sources cited supra note 34
(explaining the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law including
proportionality and distinction); Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51,
57.
132. Russian Defense Ministry Disproves Media Reports About Russian
Airstrikes in Palmira, RUSS. NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:47 PM),
http://tass.ru/en/defense/826656 (statement by General Konashenkov); see also
Martin Chulov & Kareem Shaheen, Russia’s Airstrikes on Syria Appear Futile
with Little Progress on Ground, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2015, 8:46 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/21/russias-airstrikes-on-syriastruggle-to-spur-progress-on-the-ground (at least 600 civilian deaths caused by
Russian air strikes by this date).
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offensives.133 If the scope of the Russian intervention is limited
to airstrikes, with minimal or no command and control over SAA
offensives and no direct Russian combat operations, then Russia
need only concern itself with the rules of IHL pertaining to the
permissible methods of conducting airstrikes within the
aforementioned peremptory norms. On the other hand, if
Russian control over the operations of the SAA and its allies
rises to a level creating commander-subordinate relationships
between Russian commanders and pro-Assad forces, then state
responsibility and command responsibility will broaden the
scope of criminal liability applicable to Russian military
operations in Syria.134 Command responsibility will hold
Russian military and civilian commanders criminally liable for
knowingly failing to prevent, suppress, or punish war crimes and
other violations of IHL or ICL committed by their subordinates
in the Russian Military, the SAA, and other loyalist factions of
the conflict.135 Since Russian military commanders act as agents
of the Russian state, any such liability they incur under
command responsibility will be attributed to the Russian State,
making it liable under state responsibility.136
1. State Responsibility: Pro-Assad Forces Have Committed
Grave Violations of IHL, but State Responsibility
Only Potentially Inculpates Russia for the Operations of
the Russian Air Force in the Absence of Direct Russian
Involvement in Ground Offensives
The Assad regime has committed many atrocities, which
rise to the level of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in
133. See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, New Battlefield Video Shows How Russia’s
Elite KSO Military Unit Is Fighting in Syria, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/13/newbattlefield-video-shows-how-russias-elite-kso-military-unit-is-fighting-insyria/?utm_term=.7d0e48a4cd42; Siobhan O’Grady & Reid Standish, Russian
Troops in Syria Will ‘Stay Until the End’, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:22
PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/22/russian-troops-in-syria-will-stayuntil-the-end/ (speculation that the SAA offensive in Latakia Province is being
led by Russian generals); Ryan Rifai, Activists Geolocate Russian Soldiers on
Ground in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 8, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.al
jazeera.com/news/2015/11/activists-geolocate-russian-soldiers-ground-syria151108135416902.html (speculation that Russian ground troops are directly
participating in Syrian offensive operations).
134. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 391–96.
135. See id.
136. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 29, arts. 1–2, 4–6, 8, 16.
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flagrant violation of peremptory norms of IHL and the 1998
Rome Statute.137 Forces aligned with President Assad
infamously launched chemical weapons attacks on rebel held
areas in Damascus, which various estimates have stated killed
between 281 and 1,729 people.138 Among the other human rights
and IHL violations committed by pro-Assad forces are looting,
torture, rape, murder, ethnic cleansing, forced starvation of
besieged populations in rebel-held cities, the use of
indiscriminate weapons such as barrel bombs,139 and other grave
violations of international law.140 Russian cooperation with the
SAR government puts Russia in the undesirable position of
having the acts of pro-Assad forces in the SAA and NDF
attributed to it as a state under the doctrines of state
responsibility and attribution.
Article 1 of the International Law Commission’s Report on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(2001) declares state responsibility to mean that “[e]very
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international

137. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 30th Sess., ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015).
138. See Office of the Press Secretary, Government Assessment of the Syrian
Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, THE WHITE
HOUSE:
PRESIDENT
BARACK
OBAMA
(Aug.
30,
2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/governmentassessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21; S.B., If
This Isn’t A Red Line, What Is?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 21, 2013, 9:48 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/08/syria-s-war; Syria National Executive Summary of Declassified Intelligence, FRENCH EMBASSY IN
PRETORIA (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org/Syria-Nationalexecutive-summary; Bodies Still Being Found After Alleged Syria Chemical
Attack: Opposition, DAILY STAR: LEBANON (Aug. 22, 2013, 2:20 PM),
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-22/228268-bodiesstill-being-found-after-alleged-syria-chemical-attackopposition.ashx#axzz2chzutFua.
139. See S.C. Res. 2139, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5, 11 (Feb. 22, 2014) (“Demands that all
parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the
indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling
and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs, and methods of
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering, and recalls in this regard the obligation to respect and ensure respect
for international humanitarian law in all circumstances, and further recalls, in
particular, the obligation to distinguish between civilian populations and
combatants, and the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, and attacks
against civilians and civilian objects as such.”) (emphasis omitted).
140. Id.; see also World Report 2015: Syria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/syria.
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responsibility of that State.”141 Internationally wrongful acts
involve conduct consisting of an act or omission attributable to
the state under international law and “[c]onstitutes a breach of
an international obligation of the State” through its officials or
state organs.142 Individuals other than state organs and officials
can also have their conduct attributed to the state should they
be “empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of
the governmental authority . . . provided the person or entity is
acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”143 The placing
of state organs under the command of another state will not
obviate attribution to the former state if such state organ “is
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority
of the State at whose disposal it is placed.”144 The conduct of
individuals will also be attributed to a state if they are “acting
on the instructions of . . . that State in carrying out the conduct,”
and a state knowingly assisting another state in the commission
of an internationally wrongful act will also inculpate the former
state.145
As applied to the Russian intervention, these rules would
attribute any breaches of international law committed by
individuals, deemed de facto agents of the Russian State, to the
state directly.146 While the Russian government claims that its
assistance to the SAR is limited to airstrikes, training, and
supplying arms, there are allegations that Russian commanders
stationed in Western Syria are overseeing SAA offensives
against opposition rebels.147 Some reports allege that Russian
troops are directly participating in SAA ground offensives,
although the existence of direct Russian participation in such
offensives beyond the use of Special Forces units during the SAA
re-conquest of Palmyra from ISIL remains unconfirmed.148 If
Russian involvement in the intervention escalates beyond this
141. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 29, art. 1.
142. Id. arts. 2, 4.
143. Id. art 5.
144. Id. art. 6.
145. Id. arts. 8, 16.
146. Id. arts. 1–2, 4–6, 8, 16.
147. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (explaining the evidence for
Russian command and control over pro-Assad forces).
148. See sources cited supra note 133 (explaining the evidence for Russian
command and control over pro-Assad forces); see also sources cited supra note
4 and accompanying text (explaining Russian aerial and ground operations in
Syria); sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining Russian
and Iranian assistance in the Syrian Civil War, the origins of the Syrian Civil
War, and the various parties to the conflict).
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stage of participation, however, Russian commanders and any
Russian or pro-Assad forces placed under their command will be
deemed organs of the Russian State. In the absence of such
evidence confirming this level of involvement, it is unlikely that
the actions of Syrian or Iranian forces will inculpate the Russian
State directly.149 The Russian operations still retain the
potential to blame the Russian State for any military action
taken which violates IHL or knowingly assisting the pro-Assad
forces in committing an internationally wrongful act.150
2. Command Responsibility: Russian Commanders May Be
Held Liable Under Indirect Command Responsibility for
the Crimes of pro-Assad Forces if a CommanderSubordinate Relationship Exists, but Evidence of Such a
Relationship is Currently Lacking
Russian military assistance to a government engaged in
systemic atrocities could create individual command liability for
Russian military commanders. Civilian and military
commanders are criminally responsible under ICL for violations
of IHL by their subordinates if they knew or had reason to know
that their subordinates committed, or were going to commit,
such crimes if they did not take all necessary and reasonable
measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such
crimes had been committed and they did not take reasonable
measures to punish the perpetrators.151 Command responsibility
can be direct or indirect, with direct responsibility involving a
direct order and indirect responsibility involving the negligence
or recklessness of a civilian or military commander.152 Indirect
command responsibility was illustrated in United States v.
Yamashita, where a Japanese military commander was
controversially convicted and sentenced to death for atrocities
committed by Japanese troops on a respondeat superior (“let the
149. See generally Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (“The Court has
taken the view that United States participation, even if preponderant or
decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the
contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning
of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the
evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the
United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military
or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.”).
150. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 29, art. 16.
151. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 507.
152. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 391–96.
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master answer”) theory of liability, even though he was unable
to communicate with his subordinate troops during the period in
which the crimes were perpetrated.153 From evidence of the
circumstances surrounding the crimes, the tribunal reasoned
that Yamashita was liable because he knew or should have
known about the crimes committed by his army and omitted to
establish the type of effective control over his troops that would
have been required under the circumstances.154
In the absence of compelling evidence of direct Russian
command over pro-Assad forces, indirect command
responsibility for joint operations of Russian and SAA, NDF, or
Iranian troops is more immediately relevant to the Syrian Civil
War. Customary IHL has generally endorsed an effective control
test to determine whether a commander-subordinate
relationship exists. The United Nations International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held that a commander
may consider a perpetrator his “subordinate” if he exercises a
degree of control rising to “[e]ffective control . . . in the sense of
having the material ability to prevent and punish the
commission of [the] offences.”155 This test allows for indirect
command responsibility for the actions of armed forces not
officially subordinate to a commander, as it does not require a
traditional military style commander-subordinate relationship
for command responsibility to attach.156
Determining whether a Russian commander exerts effective
control, and thereby bears indirect command responsibility, over
a member of pro-Assad forces is difficult given the decentralized
command structure of those forces.157 The SAA has suffered
heavy defections and casualties since the civil war began in
153. See GILL & FLECK, supra note 18, at 45; see also SOLIS, supra note 15,
at 384; United States v. Tomoyuki Yamashita, U.S. Military Commission,
Manila 8 Oct.-7 Dec. 1945; In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946).
154. See sources cited supra note 153 (explaining command responsibility).
155. Prosecutor v. Dalalic et. al. (Celebici case), Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Judgment, ¶ 256 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998);
see also Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment, ¶ 59 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 16, 2007).
156. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 403.
157. See SAMER N. ABBOUD, SYRIA 112 (2016) (“The local [loyalist] Syrian
militias have played a pivotal role during the conflict. Although they operate
with relative autonomy from the regime their participation in fighting rebel
units has reduced the burden on the increasingly emasculated SAA. Indeed,
four years after the conflict began, it is clear that the regime would not have
survived and maintained control over large parts of the country without the
active participation of militias.”).
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2011. SAA has compensated for its manpower deficit by turning
to paramilitary groups like the NDF, whose leaders some
analysts believe have become provincial warlords who are
autonomous from the Assad regime’s control.158 Furthermore,
there are reports that commanders in the Iranian military
forces, thousands of whom are currently fighting in Syria, are
increasingly exercising operational control of major ground
offensives involving the SAA, NDF, and other loyalist militias.159
The fragmentation of command and control over pro-Assad
forces will make it more difficult to determine which superior
exercises effective control and command responsibility. Even
minor direct participation by Russian ground troops can
implicate indirect command responsibility if the facts and
circumstances indicate Russian commanders exercise effective
control over allied loyalist militias.
A prominent example of indirect command responsibility
over the actions of allied militias not formally subordinate to a
military commander was shown in the Kahan Report, an Israeli
government inquiry into the 1983 Sabra and Shatila Massacres
in Lebanon. The Report explained how Israeli Defense Forces
(“IDF”) surrounded a refugee camp and, issuing no order to
158. Id. at 112 (“The presence of militias throughout the country and the
absence of rebel groups in those territories actually reflects the regime’s
weakness, for its reliance on decentralized, privatized violence has dispersed
decision-making power to centers potentially outside of the regime’s control. As
the SAA contracts further the army is forced to engage in military attacks
alongside local and regional militias. Such reliance on militias that are outside
of the immediate command and control of the regime implies a withering and
not a strengthening of the regime.”), 116 (explaining that it is estimated over
40,000 soldiers in the Syrian Arab Army have died since the start of the
conflict). But see Paul Bucala & Frederick W. Kagan, Iran’s Evolving Way of
War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria, CRITICAL THREATS (Mar. 2016),
http://www.irantracker.org/sites/default/files/imce-images/Irans_Evolving_
Way_of_War_IRGC_in_Syria_FINAL.pdf (“The National Defense Forces have
been foot soldiers and sometimes cannon fodder, but have never been in charge
of the fighting.”).
159. See Bucala & Kagan, supra note 158, at 2 (“The data shows, however,
that Iranian officers are unlikely to have been commanding Iranian troops in
Syria, as there have not been enough casualties reported among IRGC enlisted
personnel to account for the number of officers killed based on normal casualty
ratios. We hypothesize, therefore, that the IRGC has developed the ability to
send a unit cadre to Syria, implant it among groups of militias, and successfully
lead those militias in extremely hard fighting.”); see also id. at 12 (“But senior,
active duty IRGC Ground Forces commanders have also been present in the
fight since at least the summer of 2012 . . . These senior commanders were
likely providing operational and strategic support to their Syrian counterparts
in operation rooms far from the frontlines, as they were not dying in significant
numbers during the early years of the conflict.”).
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attack the camp, stood by as a contingent of allied Phalangist
militants entered the refugee camp and massacred over 1,000
Palestinian civilians.160 A government commission held that the
IDF officers bore indirect command responsibility for the attack
because they allowed the Phalangists to enter the camp and
should have foreseen the danger of a massacre. In having such
foresight, they omitted to adopt any appropriate measure to
prevent the potential risk of crime from happening.161 The
commission determined the IDF commanders knew about the
planned operation and had a duty to inform their superior
officers of the dangers involved in the operation, which they
omitted to perform.162 The commission also found that the IDF
officers who received the first reports of the massacre did not
expedite actions to prevent the continuation of the criminal acts,
thus failing to do everything in their power to prevent the
massacres.163
If a commander-subordinate relationship between Russian
commanders and Syrian and Iranian ground forces can be shown
by evidence, which it currently cannot, then Russian
commanders would likely have foresight of the atrocities those
forces intend to commit against regime opponents. In that case,
Russian commanders could be liable under the Kahan Report
standard.164 There are many difficulties associated with
arresting and prosecuting war criminals shielded by states. As
such, very few convictions have been sustained on a command
responsibility theory.165 Sanctions based on command
responsibility poses as a negligible deterrent towards Russian
collaboration with the Assad regime and its allies. Alternative
methods of deterring Russian collaboration with the Assad
regime include imposing United Nations sanctions for Russian
violations of IHL or ICL in Syria, but this may prove to be a futile
proposition given Russia’s veto power on the United Nations

160. CHANTAL MELONI, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 73 (2010).
161. See generally id.; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO
THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF. (1983) [hereinafter KAHAN REPORT].
162. See KAHAN REPORT, supra note 161 (explaining Israeli Defense Forces’
knowledge of the planned militia attack).
163. Id.
164. See generally id. (explaining the standard for indirect command
responsibility).
165. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 404–05.
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Security Council.166 If the law of armed conflict, jus ad bellum,
permits Russian intervention in Syria, and if IHL provides no
adequate deterrent to Russian military collaboration with
individual war criminals, then a narrow linkage of those two
fields of international law should be developed through state
practice tying the initial lawfulness of a state’s decision to use
military force to human rights and IHL considerations.167
D. REVISITING THE NICARAGUA DECISION: PROPOSALS FOR
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND USE OF FORCE
CONSIDERATIONS
The separation of the law of armed conflict on the legality of
a state’s use of military force from IHL, governing the lawfulness
of an individual’s conduct while engaged in an armed conflict,
currently allows for the provision of direct military assistance to
rogue states like the SAR under a presumably lawful pretense
of intervention by invitation or self-defense. A remedy to the
undesirable incentive of supporting state and non-state actors
engaged in war crimes and human rights violations may be
developed in customary international law through consistent
state practice prohibiting such assistance. The legality of any
use of force in another state’s internal armed conflict, which is
not authorized by the United Nations Security Council,
including self-defense and intervention by invitation, should be
regulated by a new peremptory norm illustrated in the proposed
Draft Article below:

166. See Michelle Nichols, Russia Vetoes U.N. Demand for End to Bombing
of Syria’s Aleppo, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN1280VJ?il=0.
167. Contra Dinstein, supra note 5, at 881 (“[O]ne of the most basic
principles of modem international law is that of a total separation between the
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.”).
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Draft Article: The Prohibition on Providing
Military Assistance to Violators of International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law
Any State which engages in the use of force in a noninternational armed conflict, not pursuant to an explicit
authorization of the UN Security Council, is bound by the
following provisions:
(1) If an organ of a State, authorizing the use of force,
is aware of a substantial likelihood under the
circumstances that by such use of force:
a. It would be providing military assistance
to a State or non-State actor, which has
committed or is committing serious
violations of international humanitarian
or human rights law, including grave
breaches of international humanitarian
law under the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I, and
b. The use of force is authorized, then;
(2) Such use of force by that State will constitute an
internationally wrongful act and a breach of
international law which will be attributed to:
a. The State which engaged in such use of
force; and
b. Any persons who are organs of that State
responsible for authorizing such use of
force.
(3) Definitions.
a. Use of Force. The term “use of force”
includes the sending of any military forces
of a state, including troops [as defined in
(3)(c)], onto the territory of another state
for purposes not limited to but including
the provision of military assistance.
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b. Military Assistance. The term “military
assistance” in this article means
assistance in the form of (i) providing
airstrikes, (ii) providing military forces,
and
(iii)
providing
artillery
bombardments or missile strikes.
c. Military Forces. The term “military
forces” includes all uniformed military
troops, all volunteer and mercenary forces
that are organs of that State, mechanized
infantry, tanks, and any other armored
vehicles.
d. Substantial Likelihood. The term “aware
of a substantial likelihood” [in (1)(a)]
includes:
i. Gross negligence in the awareness
of,
ii. Reckless indifference
awareness of, or

in

the

iii. Knowledge of, the existence of
such violations [in (1)(a)].
e. “Organs” of a state include the definitions
listed in the 2001 ILC Report.
These proposed provisions would not offend past precedent
in the law of armed conflict regarding the use of force, as they
are consistent with the ICJ’s opinion in Nicaragua v. United
States. The mere provision of arms alone does not constitute an
“armed attack” which would violate the prohibition on the use of
force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.168 If the
substance of this provision developed into a new peremptory
norm of international law, it would link international law
regulating decisions to go to war (jus ad bellum) with laws
regulating the conduct of the participants in an armed conflict
(jus in bello) by restraining invocations of self-defense or

168. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115.
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intervention by invitation to prop up entities which violate IHL,
international human rights law, and any of their applicable
peremptory norms.
In all non-international (internal) armed conflicts this Draft
Article would create a new type of internationally wrongful act
under state responsibility, authorizations of the use of force by
state organs, which provide military assistance to state or nonstate actors who have been or are engaged in grave breaches or
“serious” violations of IHL or international human rights law.
Such acts, committed where there is knowledge of or reason to
know of the existence of such violations, would attach individual
criminal liability under ICL to the state organs involved in
authorizing force and would attribute legal liability to the state.
To trigger the provision the state organ authorizing such force
must possess a mens rea of either knowing of, or being grossly
negligent or recklessly indifferent in ascertaining knowledge of
the existence of such violations, which would be determined by
an international tribunal through drawing evidentiary
inferences from case-by-case facts by the totality of the
circumstances. The Russian state would thus be liable for the
internationally wrongful act of its President (a state “organ”) as
Russia’s close and longstanding alliance with Syria make it
likely that President Putin, had knowledge of the now widely
publicized IHL and human rights violations of the Assad regime
at the time he authorized the Russian intervention in Syria.
Such a norm is unlikely to succeed through state practice in the
near future, as it would conflict with the geopolitical interests of
many states, including the permanent five members of the UN
Security Council, which have provided and continue to provide
political, economic, or military support to various governments
with appalling human rights records for a variety of reasons.169

169. See J. Sana Stuster, Mapped: The 7 Governments the U.S. Has
Overthrown, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 20, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/

08/20/mapped-the-7-governments-the-u-s-has-overthrown/ (explaining U.S.
and U.K. support for the overthrow of the democratically elected government of
Iran in favor of reestablishing the Iranian monarchy and U.S. support for other
dictators); see also Max Fisher, Why China Still Supports North Korea, in Six
Little Words, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/12/why-china-still-supports-north-korea-in-sixlittle-words; see generally Robert Marquand, An Embarrassed France
Backpedals from its Support of Tunisia’s Ben Ali, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0120/Anembarrassed-France-backpedals-from-its-support-of-Tunisia-s-Ben-Ali; /.

2017]

JUST WARS WITH UNJUST ALLIES
III.

609

CONCLUSION

Russia’s military intervention in Syria is likely justifiable
under the intervention by invitation exception to the non-use of
force principle if limited in scope to the military targeting of
terrorist groups such as ISIL, and may also be justifiable as a
lawful exercise of collective or individual self-defense. Those selfdefense justifications, while bolstered by recent state practice,
are likely weaker than the intervention by invitation exception,
and anticipatory self-defense provides no adequate legal
justification. State responsibility and attribution will hold the
Russian State to be liable for violations of international law
committed by state organs, and command responsibility could
inculpate Russian civilian and military commanders for the
actions of Russian troops and allied forces in Syria, but there is
currently insufficient evidence to establish indirect command
responsibility of SAA or NDF troops. The separation of
international law jus ad bellum from IHL jus in bello has
therefore enabled State governments such as Russia’s to back
governments which commit systemic atrocities, and no clear
peremptory norm currently forbids an otherwise lawful use of
force solely on such jus in bello grounds. The principles of the
draft article in the previous section would bring about a
desirable focus on human rights in regulating decisions by states
to enter into armed conflicts and would restrain the relative
permissibility of the intervention by invitation exception, which
may legally permit Russia to militarily back a mass-murdering
dictator so long as the scope of the military assistance Russia
provides is limited to a co-operative war against nebulously
defined “terrorist” groups.

